| Name | CVE-2015-9284 |
| Description | The request phase of the OmniAuth Ruby gem (1.9.1 and earlier) is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery when used as part of the Ruby on Rails framework, allowing accounts to be connected without user intent, user interaction, or feedback to the user. This permits a secondary account to be able to sign into the web application as the primary account. |
| Source | CVE (at NVD; CERT, LWN, oss-sec, fulldisc, Red Hat, Ubuntu, Gentoo, SUSE bugzilla/CVE, GitHub advisories/code/issues, web search, more) |
| Debian Bugs | 973384 |
Vulnerable and fixed packages
The table below lists information on source packages.
| Source Package | Release | Version | Status |
|---|
| ruby-omniauth (PTS) | buster | 1.8.1-1 | vulnerable |
| bullseye | 1.9.1-1 | vulnerable |
| sid, trixie, bookworm | 2.1.1-1 | fixed |
The information below is based on the following data on fixed versions.
| Package | Type | Release | Fixed Version | Urgency | Origin | Debian Bugs |
|---|
| ruby-omniauth | source | (unstable) | 2.0.4-2 | | | 973384 |
Notes
[bullseye] - ruby-omniauth <ignored> (Minor issue)
[buster] - ruby-omniauth <ignored> (Minor issue)
[stretch] - ruby-omniauth <no-dsa> (Minor issue)
[jessie] - ruby-omniauth <no-dsa> (Fix is in additional gem and needs CSRF protection in apps)
https://github.com/omniauth/omniauth/pull/809
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/05/26/11
Upstream considers this resolved with the change of the default config in the 2.0.0 release
https://github.com/omniauth/omniauth/discussions/1017