|Description||The request phase of the OmniAuth Ruby gem is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery when used as part of the Ruby on Rails framework, allowing accounts to be connected without user intent, user interaction, or feedback to the user. This permits a secondary account to be able to sign into the web application as the primary account.|
|Source||CVE (at NVD; CERT, LWN, oss-sec, fulldisc, bugtraq, EDB, Metasploit, Red Hat, Ubuntu, Gentoo, SUSE bugzilla/CVE, Mageia, GitHub code/issues, web search, more)|
Vulnerable and fixed packages
The table below lists information on source packages.
|ruby-omniauth (PTS)||jessie (security), jessie||1.2.1-1+deb8u1||vulnerable|
|stretch (security), stretch||1.3.1-1+deb9u1||vulnerable|
|bullseye, sid, buster||1.8.1-1||vulnerable|
The information below is based on the following data on fixed versions.
|Package||Type||Release||Fixed Version||Urgency||Origin||Debian Bugs|
[stretch] - ruby-omniauth <no-dsa> (Minor issue)
[jessie] - ruby-omniauth <no-dsa> (Fix is in additional gem and needs CSRF protection in apps)