|Description||An issue was discovered in HAProxy before 1.8.8. The incoming H2 frame length was checked against the max_frame_size setting instead of being checked against the bufsize. The max_frame_size only applies to outgoing traffic and not to incoming, so if a large enough frame size is advertised in the SETTINGS frame, a wrapped frame will be defragmented into a temporary allocated buffer where the second fragment may overflow the heap by up to 16 kB. It is very unlikely that this can be exploited for code execution given that buffers are very short lived and their addresses not realistically predictable in production, but the likelihood of an immediate crash is absolutely certain.|
|Source||CVE (at NVD; CERT, LWN, oss-sec, fulldisc, Red Hat, Ubuntu, Gentoo, SUSE bugzilla/CVE, GitHub advisories/code/issues, web search, more)|
Vulnerable and fixed packages
The table below lists information on source packages.
|bullseye (security), bullseye||2.2.9-2+deb11u5||fixed|
The information below is based on the following data on fixed versions.
|Package||Type||Release||Fixed Version||Urgency||Origin||Debian Bugs|
[stretch] - haproxy <not-affected> (Vulnerable code introduced later with HTTP/2 support)
[jessie] - haproxy <not-affected> (Vulnerable code introduced later with HTTP/2 support)
[wheezy] - haproxy <not-affected> (Vulnerable code introduced later with HTTP/2 support)