|Description||The Samba AD DC includes checks when adding service principals names (SPNs) to an account to ensure that SPNs do not alias with those already in the database. Some of these checks are able to be bypassed if an account modification re-adds an SPN that was previously present on that account, such as one added when a computer is joined to a domain. An attacker who has the ability to write to an account can exploit this to perform a denial-of-service attack by adding an SPN that matches an existing service. Additionally, an attacker who can intercept traffic can impersonate existing services, resulting in a loss of confidentiality and integrity.|
|Source||CVE (at NVD; CERT, LWN, oss-sec, fulldisc, bugtraq, EDB, Metasploit, Red Hat, Ubuntu, Gentoo, SUSE bugzilla/CVE, Mageia, GitHub advisories/code/issues, web search, more)|
Vulnerable and fixed packages
The table below lists information on source packages.
|samba (PTS)||buster, buster (security)||2:4.9.5+dfsg-5+deb10u3||vulnerable|
|bullseye (security), bullseye||2:4.13.13+dfsg-1~deb11u5||fixed|
The information below is based on the following data on fixed versions.
|Package||Type||Release||Fixed Version||Urgency||Origin||Debian Bugs|
[buster] - samba <no-dsa> (Minor issue; affects Samba as AD DC)