|Description||Calamares versions 3.1 through 3.2.10 copies a LUKS encryption keyfile from /crypto_keyfile.bin (mode 0600 owned by root) to /boot within a globally readable initramfs image with insecure permissions, which allows this originally protected file to be read by any user, thereby disclosing decryption keys for LUKS containers created with Full Disk Encryption.|
|Source||CVE (at NVD; CERT, LWN, oss-sec, fulldisc, bugtraq, EDB, Metasploit, Red Hat, Ubuntu, Gentoo, SUSE bugzilla/CVE, Mageia, GitHub code/issues, web search, more)|
|NVD severity||medium (attack range: remote)|
|Debian Bugs||931373, 931392|
Vulnerable and fixed packages
The table below lists information on source packages.
The information below is based on the following data on fixed versions.
[buster] - calamares <ignored> (Mitigated via calamares-settings-debian in Debian)
[buster] - calamares-settings-debian <no-dsa> (Will be fixed via Buster point release)
The issue itself can be adressed as well via calamares-settings-debian and
placing a more restrictive umask override in /etc/initramfs-tools/conf.d
Fixed by: https://github.com/calamares/calamares/commit/c9b675cbc64ac5aab35ddd86a64311abd50f7720